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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

GARRY S. DUPONT,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

CaseNo.20010952-CA
Priority No. 2

:

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for one count of Resisting Arrest,
a Class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 (1999), in the Third
Judicial District Court, State of Utah, the Honorable Paul G. Maughan, Judge, presiding.
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j)
(1996). See Addendum A (Judgment and Conviction).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
I. Does the conviction for interfering with an arrest fail for insufficient evidence
where the officer did not even tell Appellant that he was under arrest before Appellant
walked away from his car that was being impounded?
Standard of Review: "When examining the sufficiency of the evidence in a
criminal jury t r i a l . . . 'we review the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably
be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict of the jury.'" State v.
Widdison. 2000 UT App 185,1J16, 4 P.3d 100 (quoting State v. Fisher . 972 P.2d 90, 97
(Utah App.1998) (citations omitted)). "Under this standard, we will reverse a conviction

only when the evidence . . . i s sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed
the crime of which he [or she] was convicted."1 IdL (quoting Fisher, 972 P.2d at 97
(citations omitted) (alteration in original)).
II. Did the trial court err in submitting a flight instruction which was unsupported
in the evidence?
Standard of Review: The trial court's decision to give a flight instruction is
reviewed for correctness. See State v. Riggs, 1999 UT App 271, ^7, 987 P.2d 1281
(citation omitted).
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT
Appellant Garry S. Dupont ("Dupont") challenged the submission of the flight
instruction on the record ("R") at 286[229-30]. Trial counsel did not challenge the
conviction for interfering with an arrest for insufficient evidence. See generally 286.
Nonetheless, this issue may be raised for the first time on appeal because Dupont alleges
that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to make that argument. See State v.
Coonce, 2001 UT App 355, ^|7, 36 P.3d 533 (issues may be raised for first time on appeal
when defendant asserts claim of ineffective assistance of counsel); State v. Holgate, 2000
UT 74, ^[11, 10 P.3d 346 ("as a general rule, a defendant must raise the sufficiency of the
evidence by proper motion or objection to preserve the issue for appeal").
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STATUTORY PROVISION
The following statute is determinative of the issues on appeal:
Interference with Arresting Officer - Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 (1999):
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he has knowledge, or by the
exercise of reasonable care should have knowledge, that a peace officer is
seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention of that person or another and
interferes with the arrest or detention by:
(1) use of force or any weapon;
(2) the arrested person's refusal to perform any act required by lawful
order: (a) necessary to effect the arrest or detention; and (b) made by a
peace officer involved in the arrest or detention; or
(3) the arrested person's or another person's refusal to refrain from
performing any act that would impede the arrest or detention.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course of the Proceedings,
and Disposition in the Court Below.
Dupont was charged by information with two counts of unlawful possession of a
controlled substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-378(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 2000), and one count of interference with a peace officer making an
arrest, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305(2) (1999).
R.2-3. An arrest warrant was issued. R.l.
Dupont was tried before a jury. R.286. The trial court submitted a jury
instruction on flight, which Dupont obj ected to on the basis that it lacked an evidentiary
basis. R.286[229-30]. Trial counsel did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence
underlying the conviction of interfering with an arrest. .See generally R.286. The jury
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acquitted Dupont of the possession charges, but convicted him of interfering with arrest.
R.255 (Verdict).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On March 23, 2000, around 3 p.m., Tracy Wyant ("Wyant"), an investigator for
the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office, was surveilling a suspected drug house in Kearns.
R.286[83,86]. The Sheriffs Office had been investigating the house for a while, and had
information that one of its residents, Laurie Lund, had an extensive drug history.
R.286[l 14]. The Sheriffs Office suspected her of selling drugs. R.286[l 16].
Wyant saw Dupont working on his car in front of the house. R.286[84]. He had
never seen Dupont at the house before. R.286[ 114]. Dupont was walking back and forth
between the car and the house. IcL The trunk was open, there were tools lying on the
ground, and Dupont appeared to be working on the car. R.286[84-85]. Lund came out
of the house and got into the passenger side of Duponf s car. R.286[85]. Dupont got in
the driver's seat and they drove away. Id.
Wyant pulled up behind Dupont's car in his unmarked patrol car. R.286[86]. It
appeared to Wyant that Dupont's right rear brake light was not illuminating. R.286[86].
He initiated a traffic stop. R.286[86-87]. Dupont pulled over in the parking lot of a strip
mall. R.286[87]. Wyant identified himself to Dupont, asked for his identification,
license, registration and proof of insurance. R.286[87]. Dupont gave over all requested
items willingly. Id The car registration and Dupont's license were valid. R.286[88].
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Wyant noticed that the insurance card had lapsed. R.286[88]. Dupont insisted that he
was insured. R.286[88]. Wyant called the insurance company and learned that the
insurance had expired two weeks earlier. R.286[88].
Wyant called for back-up. Id Deputy Knighton arrived at the scene. IdL Wyant
asked Dupont to get out of the car. R.286[89]. Knighton kept an eye on Lund, who was
still sitting on the passenger side. R.286[89-90]. Wyant frisked Dupont and found no
weapons or contraband. R.286[90]. He informed Dupont that he would be cited for
lapsed insurance. R.286[91]. He also gave Dupont a written warning for the
malfunctioning brake light. Id Dupont signed the citation. Id Wyant told him that he
was free to leave at that point. IdL Meanwhile, Knighton had talked to and released
Lund. R.286[92].
Wyant also told Dupont that he was impounding the car, and offered Dupont the
chance to retrieve his belongings. R.286[91]. Dupont said that he wanted his tools and
clothes. Id Wyant retrieved the requested items, and then inventoried the car.
R.286[92]. Dupont remained while Wyant conducted the inventory search. R.286[120].
Wyant located a black shaving kit behind the driver's seat. R.286[93-94]. Dupont had
not asked for the shaving kit when he had the opportunity to retrieve his valuables
earlier. R.286[130]. When Wyant took hold of it, however, Dupont said, "give me my
shaving bag, give me my shaving bag." R.286[94]. Without Dupont's consent and for
safety reasons, Wyant opened the shaving bag to check it for weapons. R.286[94,130].
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He saw a tupperware container containing what appeared as methamphetamine, and a
baggy containing what appeared as marijuana. R.286[94]. When the kit was searched
again, later, a glass pipe, residue, and a v-shaped straw, were also located. LI The
substances were later tested and verified to be methamphetamine and marijuana.
R.286[192-93].
Wyant motioned to Knighton to detain Dupont, but he did nol inform Knighton as
to why nor did he mention the drugs. R.286[95,142]. Wyant noticed Dupont fleeing on
foot toward the street. R.286[95-96]. Wyant yelled at him to stop, but Dupont kept
running approximately thirty feet. R.286[96,134]. Wyant and Knighton chased him.
R.286[96]. When they were within three or four feet, Dupont said, "I give up. I give
up." R.286[96,143]. Wyant's report did not indicate that Dupont was running, although
he testified at trial that Dupont ran when he was fleeing. R.286[ 146].
Wyant testified that Dupont was cuffed and taken into custody because they were
concerned for his safety since he was running into the street and appeared to be fleeing.
R.286[96-97]. Wyant also testified that Dupont exhibited behavior which led him to
believe that he was on methamphetamines at the time, such as agitation and instability.
Id. Wyant further testified that Dupont had constricted pupils, jerky movements, mood
swings, and was overly emotional, also signs of methamphetamine use. R.286[99].
Wyant walked Dupont to the patrol car and informed him that he was under arrest for
possession and interference with arrest. Id
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance when he failed to challenge the
sufficiency of the evidence underlying the interfering with arrest conviction. See U.S.
Const, amend. VI; Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 688-94 (1984); State v.
Silva. 2000 UT App 292, f22, 13 P.3d 604; State v. Holgate. 2000 UT 74, 10 P.3d 346.
Such an omission fell below a reasonable professional standard of care and prejudiced
the outcome of Dupont's trial since there was no evidence that Dupont knew he was
under arrest, and the evidence does not otherwise establish his culpable intent. See Utah
Code Ann. § 76-8-305(2); State v. Kihlstrom. 1999 UT App 289, ^ 10, 988 P.2d 949;
State v. Castonguay, 663 P.2d 1323, 1326 (Utah 1983). The evidentiary weaknesses in
this case also lead to the conclusion that the trial court erred in submitting a flight
instruction to the jury, and that such error was harmful.

See State v. Riggs, 1999 UT

App 271, f7, 987 P.2d 1281; State v. Bales, 675 P.2d 573, 574-75 (Utah 1983).
ARGUMENT
I. THE CONVICTION FOR INTERFERING WITH AN ARREST FAILS
FOR INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE.
A. The Conviction Fails for Insufficient Evidence.
The State presented insufficient evidence to support the conviction for interfering
with arrest. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305(2). There was no evidence that Dupont had
knowledge that he was under arrest because Wyant did not articulate his intent. Up until
Wyant decided to arrest Dupont, he had told Dupont that he was free to leave, and he
7

only "motioned" to Knighton when he ultimately decided to detain him. In addition, the
rest of the evidence presented by the State does not establish culpable intent consistent
with someone that is interfering with arrest.
"When examining the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal jury t r i a l . . . 'we
review the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in the
light most favorable to the verdict of the jury.'" State v. Widdison. 2000 UT App 185,
HI6, 4 P.3d 100 (quoting State v. Fisher. 972 P.2d 90, 97 (Utah App. 1998) (citations
omitted)). "Under this standard, we will reverse a conviction only when the evidence . . .
4

is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have

entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he [or
she] was convicted.'" IcL (quoting Fisher, 972 P.2d at 97 (citations omitted) (alteration
in original)).
In order to convict Dupont of interfering with arrest, the State had to show beyond
a reasonable doubt the following elements:
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he has knowledge, or by the
exercise of reasonable care should have knowledge, that a peace officer is
seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention of that person or another and
interferes with the arrest or detention by: . . . (2) the arrested person's
refusal to perform any act required by lawful order: (a) necessary to effect
the arrest or detention; and (b) made by a peace officer involved in the
arrest or detention.
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305(2).1
The fully marshaled evidence is as follows:2
- Wyant stopped Dupont for a malfunctioning brake light. R.286[86-87]. He
cited Dupont for lack of insurance, and gave him a written warning for the brake light.
R.286[91]. He told him that he was free to leave. R.286[91].
- Wyant conducted an inventory search of Dupont's car. R.286[92]. He informed
Dupont that he would be inventorying the car, and gave him a chance to retrieve his
belongings before the search started. R.286[91]. Dupont remained at the scene while
Wyant inventoried the car. R.286[120].
- Dupont asked for his tools and clothes. R.286[91]. He did not ask for the
shaving kit until Wyant retrieved it from the back seat. R.286[94,130]. When Wyant
produced the shaving kit, Dupont said, "give me my shaving bag, give me my shaving
bag." R.286[94].
- Wyant opened the kit to check for weapons. R.286[94]. He found substances in
the kit that appeared to be methamphetamine and marijuana. R.286[94]. A later search

1

The State charged Dupont under this version of § 76-8-305. R.2-3
(Information). The jury was similarly instructed under this subsection of the statute.
R.243 (Instruction No. 21).
2

"To demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient to support [a] jury verdict, the
one challenging the verdict must marshal the evidence in support of the verdict and then
demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient when viewed in the light most favorable to
the verdict." State v. Hopkins. 1999 UT 98, ^14, 989 P.2d 1065 (citation omitted).
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of the kit also revealed a glass pipe, residue, and a v-shaped straw. IcL The substances
were tested and verified to be methamphetamine and marijuana. R.286[ 192-93].
- Wyant motioned to Knighton to detain Dupont. R.286[95]. Wyant testified that
Dupont fled the scene at that point, running toward the street. R.286[95-96J. Wyant
yelled at him to stop, but Dupont kept running approximately thirty feet. R.286[96,134].
Wyant and Knighton gave chase. R.286[96]. When they got within three to four feet of
Dupont, Dupont said, "I give up, I give up." R.286[96,143]. They took him to the
ground and cuffed him. R.286[96].
- Wyant informed him that he was under arrest for possession and resisting arrest,
Dupont stated, "you didn't catch the big fish," referring to the possession charges.
R.286[102]. Wyant testified that Dupont exhibited signs of methamphetamine use,
including agitation, unsteadiness, mood swings, and extreme emotion. R.286[96-97,99].
- Prior to this incident, Wyant observed Dupont at a known drug house.
R.286[84]. He was driving in his car along with a resident of the house, Lund, a known
drug user and a suspected drug dealer. R.286[l 14,116].
This evidence, even when viewed in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict,
does not support the charge of interfering with arrest. .See State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT
98, ^ 14, 989 P.2d 1065 (citation omitted) (moving party must marshal all evidence and
then establish that it is insufficient to support verdict).
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First, there is scant evidence that Dupont" ha[d] knowledge, or by the exercise of
reasonable care should have [had] knowledge, that [Wyant was] seeking to effect a
lawful arrest or detention." Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305. Wyant never informed Dupont
that he was under arrest until after Dupont was tackled, cuffed, and taken to the patrol
car. R.286[96,99]. Nor did he explicitly ask Knighton to detain Dupont. R.286[95].
Rather, he only "motioned" to Knighton to detain him, without mentioning the drug
discovery. IcL Thus, it cannot be said that Dupont overheard the order and knew that he
was to be arrested or detained from that. In fact, up to the moment when the drugs were
discovered, Wyant told Dupont that he was free to leave. R.286[120]. Consequently,
Dupont did not have actual knowledge that he was under arrest or to be detained. See
Utah Code Ann. §76-8-305.
Likewise, it is unlikely that Dupont could have known through reasonable care.
See id. Although the State sought conviction on two counts of possession, its evidence is
so weak that the jury acquitted Dupont on those charges. R.255. By extension, there is
little or no support that Dupont understood that Wyant discovered drugs in the shaving
kit when Wyant "motioned" to Knighton. R.286[94-95,142]. Consequently, it cannot be
reasonably inferred that he interpreted Wyant's signal as an intent to arrest or detain him
for the drugs. Rather, Dupont likely left because he still held the impression that he was
free to leave absent an express warning to the contrary, and did not understand that drugs
were found or that Wyant wished to detain him.
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Indeed, the link between Dupont and the drugs found in the shaving kit is so
attenuated that actual knowledge of Wyant's intent to arrest or detain him cannot be
inferred therefrom. The tupperware container and baggy containing the drugs were
never tested for fingerprints. R.286[ 135-36]. Dupont did not have any weapons on him
which might indicate drug involvement. R.286[90]. He had never been seen at the drug
house surveilled by Wyant, and none of the Sheriffs Office intelligence otherwise linked
him to the activity there. R.286[l 14]. By contrast, Lund, Dupont's passenger, lived at
the residence, had a known drug history, and was suspected by the Sheriffs Office of
dealing drugs out of the house. R.286[l 15-16].
Moreover, the evidence strongly suggests that Lund placed the drugs in the
shaving kit unbeknownst to Dupont. Assuming for the sake of argument only that the kit
belonged to Dupont, Wyant could not offer any testimony suggesting that he had
exclusive control over it. See generally 286[82-148]. He could only testify that Dupont
was working on the car when Lund got into it and they drove away. R.286[85]. Lund
could have slipped the drugs in the kit any time before or during their drive without
Dupont ever knowing.
Wyant similarly could not exclude the possibility that Lund placed the drugs in the
kit once Wyant stopped Dupont's car. She was left unattended in Dupont's car for a few
minutes while Dupont and Wyant discussed the insurance issue, and therefore had an
opportunity to slip the drugs in the kit unnoticed. R.286[127]. Assuming for the sake of
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argument only that the kit was behind the driver's seat all the time, Lund could have
reached it from the front passenger seat by simply reaching behind Dupont's seat;
Dupont, on the other hand, could not have reached it so easily, especially while driving.
Although Knighton ultimately arrived on the scene and kept an eye on Lund, he released
her without ever getting a statement from her. R.286[89-90]. The State did not put
Knighton on the stand to establish the extent that he observed her activity, and whether
he could in fact state with certainty that she had no opportunity to put the drugs in the kit
while he was watching her. See generally R.286.
The conviction for interfering with arrest also fails because it does not establish
his culpable intent. "Knowledge or intent is a state of mind generally to be inferred from
the person's conduct viewed in light of all the accompanying circumstances." State v.
Kihlstrom. 1999 UT App 289, ^ 10, 988 P.2d 949 (citations omitted). "The law can
presume the intention so far as realized in the act, but not an intention beyond what was
so realized.'" State v. Castonguav, 663 P.2d 1323, 1326 (Utah 1983) (quotation omitted).
Wyant's own testimony establishes that he had only told Dupont that he was free
to leave, and that he did not inform him that he was going to be arrested or detained after
the drugs were found in the shaving kit. R.286[91,120,129,133]. Wyant did not even
articulate his intention to Knighton, instead "motion[ing]" to him. R.286[95]. This
evidence alone strongly undermines any inference that Dupont left the scene under any
other impression than he was free to do so.
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In addition, Dupont's behavior is not that of someone attempting to evade arrest
or detention. Dupont did not immediately flee the scene when Wyant decided to
inventory the car. R.286[120]. Rather, he remained close by as the inventory search
occurred. Id; see, e.g.. State v. Llovd. 552 S.E.2d 596, 526 (N.C. 2001) (sufficient
evidence to support flight instruction where defendant left scene quickly). He was
otherwise compliant with Wyant, as well, readily handing over his license, registration
and insurance card upon request. R.286[87]; cf Oliver v. Woods. 209 F.3d 1179, 118990 (10th Cir. 2000) (interpreting Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305, court held that defendant's
refusal to hand over identification and leaving scene of suspected crime constituted
interfering with arrest).
Moreover, Dupont did not resist arrest when the officers gave chase. Once
Dupont left, Wyant yelled at him to stop. R.286[96]. Nothing in the record establishes
that Dupont heard the directive or that Wyant said it more than once. Wyanl, however,
testified that Dupont appeared to be under the influence of methamphetamines.
R.286[96-97]. In this drug-induced state of mind, Dupont likely ran based on an
heightened feeling of paranoia and anxiety, rather than any real motivation to avoid
arrest. In fact, Dupont stopped right away, saying, "I give up, I give up," when the
officers got within three or four feet of him. R.286[96,143]; see, e.g.. Dixon v. State.
437 N.E.2d 1318, 1323 (IN 1982) (sufficient evidence for flight instruction where
defendant continued to flee on foot, even after officer shot out tires in car).
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In all, Dupont only traveled thirty feet, roughly the span of a large room.
R.286[134]. Dupont did not attempt to run behind buildings where he could conceal
himself. Rather, he proceeded down a street in plain view. R.286[95-96]; see, e.g..
People v. Cowgen 249 Cal. Rptr. 240, 246 (Cal. App. 1988) (sufficient evidence
supporting flight instruction where defendant took circuitous route in evading arrest).
Dupont did not struggle when the officers when they tackled and cuffed him.
R.286[96]: see Bovington v. State, 559 S.E.2d 154, 155 (GA App. 2002) (sufficient
evidence of obstructing a police officer when defendant resisted, kicked and pushed
officers as they tried to cuff him). Wyant testified that he cuffed Dupont because he felt
Dupont was a danger to himself since he was running in the street where he could be hit
and exhibited signs of methamphetamine use. R.286[96-97]. Wyant did not assert that
he was cuffed because he violently resisted arrest. See generally R.286[82-148].
In short, the evidence "'is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt'" that Dupont knew he was
under arrest or even that drugs were found in the shaving kit. See Widdison, 2000 UT
App 185 at ^{16 (quotation omitted). Moreover, the overall circumstances do not support
an inference of culpable intent. See Castonguay, 663 P.2d at 1326. At most, it
establishes that Dupont left under the impression that he was free to do so, especially
where Wyant did not articulate his intention to arrest or detain Dupont to anyone at the
scene.
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B. Dupont Was Denied His Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel When His
Attorney Failed to Challenge the Sufficiency of the Evidence Underlying
the Conviction for Interfering with Arrest.
Dupont's attorney failed to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence underlying
the conviction for interfering with arrest. See generally R.286 (Trial). Such an omission
constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel, a right guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment
to the United States Constitution, because it fell below an objectively reasonable standard
of professional care and prejudiced the outcome of Dupont's trial. See Strickland v.
Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 688-94 (1984); State v. Silva. 2000 UT App 292, Tf22, 13
P.3d604.
Defense counsel's omission falls below an objectively reasonable standard of
professional care given the Utah Supreme Court's opinion in State v. Holgate, 2000 UT
74, 10 P.3d 346. Hoi gate holds that "a defendant must raise [a challenge toj the
sufficiency of the evidence by proper motion or objection to preserve the issue for
appeal." IdLat1[16.
Moreover, the omission cannot be seen as tactical in any way. See Taylor v.
Warden, 905 P.2d 277, 282 (Utah 1995) (counsel's performance is reasonable if tactical).
There is no conceivable advantage in refraining from challenging the sufficiency of the
evidence. Such challenges can be made outside the presence of the jury, thereby
avoiding the risk of prejudice to the client.
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In addition, defense counsel was aware of the evidentiary weaknesses underlying
the interfering with arrest conviction. He challenged the flight instruction on some of the
same evidentiary grounds, such as the short distance that Dupont actually traveled.
R.286[229-30]. He also made the logical connection between flight and the offense of
interfering with arrest, stating "I suppose the conduct has been encompassed [] within . . .
interfering. It's either interfering or it isn't." R.286[229]. Consequently, it cannot be
said that defense counsel made a viable strategic decision to not challenge the sufficiency
of the evidence in light of Hoi gate and his own recognition of the evidentiary
weaknesses articulated on the record to the court. See Taylor, 905 P.2d at 282.
Defense counsel's failure to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence prejudiced
Dupont's trial, as well. See Strickland. 466 U.S. at 688; Silva. 2000 UT App 292 at Tf22.
Counsel's deficient performance merits a new trial where, as here, "there is a reasonable
probability that the outcome of trial would have been different" if he had challenged the
sufficiency of the evidence. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. This is a "probability that is
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome" of trial. Id. at 694. As noted supra
Point I.A., the outcome of Dupont's trial would have been different because the evidence
underlying the interfering with arrest charge is, in fact, insufficient. A challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence, therefore, would have made the difference between
conviction and acquittal.
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In light of the foregoing, Dupont was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the
effective assistance of counsel where his attorney failed to challenge the sufficiency of
the evidence underlying his conviction, such omission cannot be justified as tactical or
objectively reasonable, and the outcome of Dupont's trial was prejudiced as a result. See
U.S. Const, amend. VI; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-94; Silva, 2000 UT App 292 at f22.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING A FLIGHT
INSTRUCTION THAT IS NOT SUPPORTED IN THE EVIDENCE.
The trial court erred in giving a flight instruction that is not supported in the
evidence. See State v. Riggs. 1999 UT App 271, Tf7, 987 P.2d 1281 (citation omitted).
"Flight instructions are proper when supported by the evidence. Additionally, the
instructions must 'bear a relationship to evidence reflected in the record.'" Id at ^9
(citing State v. Bales. 675 P.2d 573, 574-75 (Utah 1983); quoting State v. Pacheco. 495
P.2d 808 (Utah 1972)).
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that a flight instruction is appropriate
only if
the evidence supports four inferences: 1) the defendant's conduct
constituted flight: 2) the defendant's flight was the result of consciousness
of guilt; 3) the defendant's guilt related to the crime with which he was
charged; and, 4) the defendant felt guilty about the crime charged because
he, in fact, committed the crime.
U.S. v.Martinez, 190 F.3d 673, 678 (5th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). The evidence
presented in Dupont's case does not support these inferences.

18

First, Dupont's conduct did not constitute flight. See kL As noted above, he was
never informed that he was under arrest or that drugs were found. R.286[ 133]. Indeed,
up to the moment of the discovery, Wyant communicated to Dupont that he was free to
leave. Id Wyant only "motioned" to Knighton once drugs were found. R.286[95]. He
did not articulate anything, however. Id There is nothing in the record which suggests
that Dupont understood the signal to mean that drugs were found and he was under
arrest. Consequently, the evidence at most supports that Dupont left under the
impression that he was still free to leave.
In addition, Dupont only ran thirty feet before stopping. R.286[ 134]. He did not
run between buildings or large objects that would conceal him. R.286[95-96]; see
Cowger, 249 Cal. Rptr. 240, 246 (Cal. App. 1988) (sufficient evidence for flight
instruction where defendant took circuitous route in running from police). Rather, he ran
straight down the street. R.286[95-96]. Dupont also stopped when the officers came
within three to four feet of him. R.286[143]. He did not continue to run. IdL; see Dixon,
437 N.E.2d at 1323 (flight instruction supported in evidence where defendant continued
to flee on foot after officer shot out his tires).
The evidence similarly fails to support an inference that the "flight was the result
of consciousness of guilt." Martinez, 190 F.3d at 678. Dupont did not manifest any
behavior from which consciousness of guilt could be inferred. He stopped without
incident when Wyant pulled him over. R.286[86-87]. He complied with Wyant's
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requests for his license, registration and proof of insurance. R.286[87]. The record does
not indicate that he protested the inventory search or impoundment of the car.
R.286[91]. He remained at the scene while Wyant conducted the search. R.286[120].
Wyant did not testify that Dupont exhibited any signs of nervousness or evasiveness.
See generally R.286[82-148].
Lastly, the evidence does not support that guilt, if any, "related to the crime with
which [Dupont] was charged;... [or that he] felt guilty about the crime charged because
he, in fact, committed the crime." Martinez, 190 F.3d at 678. As noted supra Point I.A.,
the nexus between Dupont and the drugs was so weak that the jury acquitted him of those
charges. Moreover, the evidence actually pointed to Lund as the true culprit in this case.
Unlike Dupont, she was the one with the known drug history, living in a known drug
house where she had been observed previously. R.286[l 15-16]. She also had access to
the shaving kit and an opportunity to slip drugs into it without Dupont's knowledge. See
supra Point LA. Indeed, had Dupont known the drugs were in the kit, he would have
asked for it along with the tools and clothing that he retrieved before Wyant began the
inventory search.
The trial court's erroneous submission of the flight instruction is prejudicial. See
Bales, 675 P.2d at 576 (applying harmless error analysis). The evidence in support of the
interfering with arrest charge was so weak as to be insufficient. See supra Point LA; cf.
Bales, 675 P.2d at 576 (erroneous flight instruction was harmless where other evidence
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amply supported verdict). The instruction, although worded so as to remind the jury that
flight is consistent with innocence as well as guilt, rang a bell that lingered in the jury's
mind: that Dupont fled and therefore must be guilty of something, especially in light of
his association with Lund and his presence at the drug house. Knowing that the evidence
did not support the possession charges, yet feeling uncomfortable with acquitting Dupont
altogether, the jury was likely vulnerable to even the slightest suggestion of flight.
Accordingly, it likely convicted Dupont of interfering with arrest when it otherwise
would have not done so.
CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, Dupont respectfully requests this Court to reverse his
conviction for interfering with arrest for lack of sufficient evidence supporting the
verdict. Alternatively, Dupont requests this Court to reverse his conviction and remand
to the trial court on the basis of the prejudicial submission of the flight instruction.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this L^

day of May, 2002.

CATHERINE E. LILLY
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM A
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